At the Breaking Point. Why International Humanitarian Law Is Failing Civilians Today
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has its roots in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Geneva Conventions, first codified in 1949, aimed to protect civilians, prisoners of war and the wounded from the consequences of state conflict and civil war. Yet, we are “living through a period of highly visible and persistent violations of international law”: a major new report by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights has revealed that IHL is now at a critical breaking point.
The report shockingly concluded that more than 100,000 civilians have been killed between July 2024 and December 2025 across 23 conflicts. In Ethiopia, Haiti, Yemen and Ukraine, amongst others, murder, torture, and rape were extensiveand committed with “near impunity”. Schools, hospitals and civilians themselves were bombed frequently and even systematically. The conflict in Ukraine alone saw a 70% increase in civilian deaths in 2025 compared to 2023. In Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, immense sexual violence targeted women and children ranging from infants to the elderly. Moreover, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry found Israel had perpetrated genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, concerns over the genocide of ethnic communities in Sudan have been raised. Evidently, at face value, this horrific and seemingly increasing array of war crimes shows IHL to be failing.
The report’s conclusion is stark. Its exposure of the systemic disregard of IHL reveals that the gap between treaty obligations and the reality of conflict is widening. This disjunction, however, is not due to a lack of clearly codified legal rules. As noted by Michael Addo, professor of law at the University of Notre Dame, “Humanitarian law has become a term of art, a term that only sets the rules”. The problem IHL faces ultimately lies in political will and enforcement. Its enforcement relies primarily on states to investigate and prosecute violations. But in practice, states, especially powerful ones, rarely hold themselves accountable, with the enforcement framework being fundamentally vulnerable to power politics. For instance, within the UN system, the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom possess veto powers capable of blocking collective humanitarian action. The International Criminal Court was designed to fill this gap. Yet, likewise, its effectiveness is diminished by its limited reach. The court only has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals from states party to its founding Rome Statute or those referred to by the Security Council. Major powers including Russia, the United States, China, Israel and India are not even members of the court; and even where jurisdiction exists, state cooperation is again required for arrest and evidence. De facto, such a system of IHL enforcement allows certain states to act almost without consequence. A significant recent example lies in the United States’ capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro. While “clearly internationally unlawful”the operation received virtually no tangible fallback. Resultingly, promises and obligations of cooperation frequently stall and stagnate.
Domestic politics, too, complicate matters. The UK government stated that harm to civilians was “tragic” but not evidence of IHL violations. It also rejected recommendations to legislate binding due diligence requirements on UK arms manufacturers where there was a clear risk of such weapons being used in suspected breaches of IHL. This comes at a time of controversy over the UK’s supply of fighter jet parts to Israel. Such a position highlight that even where affirmations of IHL are made, states often prioritise their own economic and political interests.
Against this, the report argues for the introduction of a number of proposals with the intention of minimising civilian harm in urban warfare. Firstly, a ban of arms sales by countries where there’s a clear risk the weapons will be used to commit or facilitate violations of IHL. Secondly, to prohibit the use of unguided gravity bombs and inaccurate long-range artillery in populated areas, alongside restrictions on drone and AI targeting systems. It also called for political and financial support of the ICC and national war crime tribunals to ensure systematic prosecution. Notably, the international community is showing signs of mobilisation. The leaders of Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan, and South Africa launched a global initiative to impel political commitment to IHL. This culminated in a proposed High-Level Meeting to Uphold Humanity in War in 2026, which will produce concrete recommendations for addressing IHL challenges. More than 130 states have participated in consultations, with 90 formally joining the initiative. Evidently, a substantial coalition of states remain invested in preserving IHL, despite its challenges.
The IHL crisis is therefore ultimately a political one. Prohibitions of war crimes are clear, yet enforcement is repeatedly shaped by power and state interests. To prevent its collapse, states must work to remove the means for committing violations, and ensure funding for prosecution. Where the post-1945 order understood war destabilises the international system, the survival of IHL depends on states’ willingness to subordinate power to the law.
By Adam Nealon
