When Protest becomes terrorism: The Legal Battle Over Palestine Action
At this point, it would be an understatement to say that the Palestine–Israel conflict has caused
polarisation within society. This is a divide that has now extended into the legal sphere. In the
author’s view, the support for, or lack thereof, for Palestine should not be regarded as relevant
for the purpose of this article. The intention here is to maintain a politically neutral stance,
focusing solely on the legal and policy considerations that are, and should have been, pertinent
to the issue.
The first and perhaps most serious question is whether the proscription of Palestine Action
constitutes a breach of Articles 10 and 11 of the Human Rights Act 1998, that is the right to
freedom of expression and the right for assembly. This issue is inherently complex but broadly
turns on whether the “restrictions” clauses within section 2 of both Articles apply to the
present case. It would be frivolous to suggest that an organisation deemed to engage in
terrorism should fall outside the scope of such restrictions, and in fac they do not.
Since the UK Government justified its decision by reference to the Terrorism Act 2000, this
analysis will similarly follow that legislative framework. Part II, section 5 of the Act outlines
the criteria by which an organisation may be proscribed as “terrorist,” while section 1 defines
what constitutes an act of terrorism. It is logical to examine these provisions in ascending order.
Part I – Defining Terrorism
The argument that Palestine Action meets the criteria for terrorism under Part 1 is quite well
substantiated. One of the Government’s key pieces of evidence was the so-called
Underground Manual, a brochure instructing members to identify, target, and “leave no
evidence” of attacks against properties associated with the Israeli arms trade. This manual
strongly supports the argument for proscription under section 1(2), as it advocates violence
against property and arguably endangers public safety, encouraging individuals to “break in”
and even destruct public property in “blocking the pipes” of the aforementioned companies to
“destroy targets”. It also satisfies section 1(1), which concerns the use of actions designed to
advance a political or ideological cause. This section of the Act should not particularly require
much explanation, it is clear that members of and the Palestine action group fit this criteria.
Evidence of these actions materialising is not scarce. Palestine Action has claimed responsibility
for property damage exceeding £7 million on single occasions, assaults on police officers,
alongside acts of vandalism and reckless criminal damage involving tools such as spray cans and
sledgehammers. Accordingly, it is difficult to maintain the notion that Palestine Action
represents a movement of peaceful protest as several of its activities fall squarely within what
the Terrorism Act prescribes as acts of terrorism.
Part II – Proscription Criteria
Turning to Part II of the act, similar conclusions can be drawn. Section 5 makes clear that an
organisation may be proscribed as ‘terrorist’ if it endorses acts of terrorism as defined in section
1(4). The Underground Manual, alongside numerous social media posts (many of which have
since been removed), demonstrates active encouragement of individuals to take action against
“pro-Israeli” companies, inciting, organising, and facilitating damage to private and public
property. This strongly supports the satisfaction of section 4.
Furthermore, section 5(a), concerning the glorification of terrorism, is also well supported.
The organisation’s communications clearly celebrated such actions against “complicit”
entities. Accordingly, the subsequent, albeit controversial, restriction of online content
glorifying these activities has a clear legal basis under section 5(b) of the Act.10.
On this analysis, the decision of the Secretary of State for Defence to proscribe Palestine Action
appears consistent with both the Terrorism Act and the Human Rights Act.
The Question of “Glorification” – A Slippery Slope
However, the semantic boundaries of “glorification” warrant closer scrutiny. While Palestine
Action’s conduct can be classified as terrorist within the meaning of the Act, there exists a
dangerous overlap between criminal “glorification” and legitimate political expression. It is
imperative that the government distinguish between individuals who promote or condone
terrorist acts and those who merely express solidarity with the Palestinian people or even an
anti-israeli or war stance.
Freedom of expression and freedom of association, protected under Articles 10 and 11 of the
Human Rights Act, must remain intact. Unless individuals are explicitly supporting or
glorifying the Palestine Action group itself, caution must be exercised in restricting or
prosecuting social media users for expressing pro-Palestine views. Failure to observe this
distinction risks overreach and potential violations of fundamental human rights. People
should not be lead to belive that their right to protest could lead to their criminal prosectuion,
but this factor of intimidation should be used with care by prosecuting authorities.
By Soma A. Kemeny