What’s Happening In Kosovo?
In the historically volatile area of south-eastern Europe, ethnic tensions have once again risen between Kosovan Albanians and ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo following a dispute over car licence plates. Tensions remained high into January 2023, but it appears that under EU mediation an agreement is being reached that is hoped will defuse tensions on both the domestic and international stage.
A brief history
Tensions in Kosovo first flared in 1998, when the then-province of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) sought independence and fought a guerilla war against Serbian forces. Serbia retaliated against this movement for autonomy, by brutally attacking, killing, and expelling ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The Kosovo War ended in 1999 following UN intervention via an aerial bombing campaign against Serbian targets, forcing Belgrade to withdraw from the province and give it de-facto independence.
Ethnic relations in Kosovo have remained strained since the country’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008, an act which Serbia still does not recognise as legitimate on the international stage. Current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has vowed that his nation will never recognise Kosovo as an independent state. ensions therefore remain unresolved between the ethnic Albanian majority (who dominate the country’s government) and the sizeable Serb minority, who continue to seek greater recognition and autonomy within their areas of Kosovo with support from the Belgrade government.
Nevertheless, 99 out of 193 UN nations now recognise Kosovo’s independence, including 22 out of the 27 EU member states. However, Kosovo has been blocked from becoming a UN member state by the intervention of Russia and China, likely at the behest of Serbia, a key Russian ally within the UN. In spite of this, Kosovo has signalled its intentions to join the European Union and UN and formally submitted their application for membership of the EU on 15 December 2022.
What is happening now?
The latest period of ethnic conflict within the country involved a Kosovan governmental mandate regarding car registration plate requirements – Kosovan drivers were told to display Kosovan licence plates on their vehicles, with a fine of €150 (£130) instituted for those who did not change their number plates after the decision took effect. This decision riled the ethnic Serb community in the northern areas of Kosovo, who refused to swap their pre-independence Belgrade-issued number plates f in an act of symbolic defiance against Kosovan independence and a rejection of the authority of Pristina.
After postponing the decision in August 2022 after negotiations with the EU, the Kosovan government began instituting its plan on 1 November 2022, leading to the resignation of 600 Serb police officers, as well as many resignations among Serb civil officials and judges. This plan was also met with defiant reactions within majority-Serb enclaves in the north of the country, who viewed the act (and the accompanying drive to swap to Kosovan-issued personal documents) as infringing upon their identity as Serbians. These tensions were exacerbated when three former Serbian police officers who resigned in protest of the new laws were arrested on suspicion of terrorism charges – leading to Serb nationalists protesting and blockading roads in the city of Mitrovica on 10 December 2022. Serbs have also vented their frustration and hostility to Pristina by refusing to pay energy bills to the Kosovan power operator, and attacking police officers who try to make arrests.
Kosovan Police have also been targeted, with incidents reported on 6 August and repeated attacks on police officers on 8-11 December.
International reaction
In reaction to these events, international tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have also heightened, with Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo, accusing Belgrade of being behind and supporting the unrest on their shared border. In response to these accusations, on 18 October 2022 the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that Pristina’s actions continue to deepen ethnic differences in north Kosovo, destabilising the situation further.
President Vučić of Serbia has also responded to the increasingly volatile situation on 19 August 2022 by vowing to “defend Kosovan Serbs if NATO fails to do so”. To this effect, the Serbian army was placed on “high alert” on 2 November 2022, and on 16 December 2022 the Serbian government petitioned NATO for the right to deploy 1000 Serbian soldiers into northern Kosovo to protect Kosovan Serbs from “harassment”. This request was declined by Kosovo Force, the NATO armed force stationed in Kosovo, on 8 January 2023.
The EU has positioned itself as a conciliatory mediator during this period of volatility in the Balkans, hosting negotiations between Kosovan and Serbian delegates and offering the mutually agreed “French-German Proposal” as a basis for talks. In addition, Serbian President Vučić expressed hesitancy to disrupt Serbia’s admission into the EU, saying that without it Serbia would be “lost… alone and isolated”, suggesting that he may be more willing to de-escalate conflict with Kosovo to protect his country’s entrance to the EU. Nonetheless, doubts are growing that an EU-mediated agreement to avoid escalation of the conflict will be reached between the parties by the March 2023 deadline.
The UN has repeatedly urged for restraint and constructive dialogue between the various domestic and international parties in this conflict, whilst NATO has reinforced its “Kosovo Force” armed peacekeeping mission in response to heightened tensions in the region. The USA has also operated in a mediatory capacity, dispatching senior diplomats to Belgrade and Pristina and advocating for de-escalation and normalisation of relations between the two states.
Russia has been accused of supporting Serbia’s exacerbation of tensions in Kosovo, especially following Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia in response to the unlawful invasion of Ukraine. Kosovan President Vjosa Osmani has also stated that Russia could use conflict in the Balkans to widen the conflict started in Ukraine and destabilise Europe further.
Conclusion
It is currently unclear how far, if at all, this situation is going to be resolved by the March 2023 EU deadline, but Kosovo’s formal application to join the EU along with increased pressure from the West for a quick resolution in the face of the Ukraine War suggest that there is a chance an agreement will be reached and peaceful détente will once again prevail over this oft-volatile area of Europe.
